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Left for Dead?: The Supreme Court's Treatment of the New
Value Exception in Bank of America National Trust &
Savings Association v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership
When a financially troubled company is forced to file for
bankruptcy, it can choose to reorganize the company under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code.' Chapter 11 functions as an alternative to
liquidation under Chapter 72 and provides for the reorganization of
businesses that are eligible for bankruptcy relief.3 The chapter's
primary purpose is to grant relief in situations in which a business's
assets have little liquidation value, but the business itself is worth
keeping intact.4 The policy goals behind Chapter 11 reorganization
are twofold. First, a reorganization should preserve the business as a
going concern, allowing jobs to be saved and the business to continue
to function.' Second, a reorganization should maximize the property
and value available to the shareholders by continuing all profitable
activities.7
When a debtor decides to file a petition under Chapter 11, the
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1994).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1994).
3. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, TBE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 230 (1992); GEORGE
M. TREISTER ET AL., FuNDAMENTALS OF BANKRuPTCY LAW § 9.01, at 419 (4th ed.
1996); Mark A. McDermott, Bankruptcy Reorganizations: Before and After the Supreme
Court's Stillborn Decision in 203 North LaSalle, FED. LAW., Aug. 1999, at 22, 23 (1999).
Reorganization is also available to individuals, but is rarely employed by an individual in
the absence of a substantial business operation. See BAIRD, supra, at 15.
4. See BAIRD, supra note 3, at 56-57. The most frequently cited example is that of a
railroad company. See id A railroad's assets, such as rights-of-way, tracks, and bridges,
have minimal scrap value. See id. A careful reorganization of the railroad, however, may
allow it to continue to function and likely would be the most efficient use of its assets. See
id
5. See Rafeal Efrat, Toibb v. Radloff Reconsidered: Reorganization Under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code by a Consumer Debtor, 26 BEVERLY HILLS B.A. J. 82, 90
(1992).
6. See Lowell P. Bottrell, The Supreme Court and the "Plain Meaning" of the
Bankruptcy Code: A Review of Recent and Pending Supreme Court Decisions, 69 N.D. L.
REv. 155, 159 (1993); Dan Deating, Good Intentions, Bad Economics: Retiree Insurance
Benefits in Bankruptcy, 43 VAND. L. REv. 161, 188 (1990); Efrat, supra note 5, at 90; Hon.
Edith H. Jones, Chapter 11: A Death Penalty for Debtor and Creditor Interests, 77
CORNELL L. REv. 1088, 1089 (1992); J. Maxwell Tucker, The Clash of Successor Liability
Principles, Reorganization Law, and the Just Demand That Relief Be Afforded Unknown
and Unknowable Claimants, 12 BANKR. DEv. J. 1, 7 (1995).
7. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH.
L. REv. 336, 344 (1993); Nathan F. Coco, Note, An Examination of Successor Liability in
the Post-Bankruptcy Context, 22 J. CORP. L. 345, 350 (1997).
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Bankruptcy Code invokes an automatic stay that immediately shelters
the business's assets.8  This stay prevents virtually any act or
proceeding against the debtor from being commenced or continued
without court approval.9 Although a stay is not permanent, it likely
will be continued by the court provided the debtor can show a
realistic prospect of reorganization.0 During a stay the debtor
negotiates with its creditors in an effort to develop an effective
reorganization strategy."
After negotiating a reorganization strategy, the debtor submits a
reorganization plan, which is the blueprint for revitalizing its
business.1 If the plan satisfies the requirements of the Bankruptcy
Code, then the court will confirm it, and the debtor will attempt to
implement the plan.3 The hope is that the debtor's plan will
rehabilitate its business, which in turn will allow creditors to realize
more from their investments than they would have if the business had
been liquidated.14 The company's owners also benefit from such a
plan because reorganization allows them the opportunity to recoup a
percentage of their initial investments.' Finally, society benefits from
a reorganization, because the business continues to provide jobs and
products in the marketplace. 6 Overall, a successful reorganization
should benefit all involved, especially when compared to the
alternative of liquidation.
Unfortunately, because the reorganization process does not
always function as planned, such efficient results are not always
achieved. Although a failing company is allowed to reorganize and
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994).
9. See id.
10. See MARTINI. BIENENSTOCK, BANKRuPTCY REORGANIZATION 7 (1987).
11. See Pat H. Scanlon, Adequate Protection and Secured Creditors' Strategies After
Timbers, 10 Miss. C. L. REv. 59,64 (1989).
12. See BAIRD, supra note 3, at 231.
13. See id.
14. The creditors' ability to realize more from the investment is due to the fact that
lenders usually will provide credit to a business based on estimates of the going concern
value of the debtor and its assets, rather than its liquidation value. See BIENENSTOCK,
supra note 10, at 5-6. If the liquidation value is higher than the going concern value, then
the parties probably will end up in a Chapter 7 liquidation. See id. If the going concern
value is higher, however, then the lenders will benefit from this reorganization because the
reorganized debtor will be able to pay off more of the lenders' claims than under
liquidation. See id.
15. See Linda J. Rusch, The New Value Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule in
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continue its operations, all reorganizations must comply with the
guiding principle of Chapter 11-that the rights of creditors transcend
the interests of the old equity holders." Simply put, in a
reorganization proceeding, the creditors must be paid in full before
the debtor's equity holders are allowed to retain any ownership in the
reorganized debtor. This idea was recognized by the Supreme Court
as early as 186819 and became ingrained in reorganization practice in
the years that followed." Today, the critical notion of protecting
creditors' rights in reorganization proceedings is known as the
"absolute priority rule" and is firmly established in the Bankruptcy
Code.21 This rule furthers the objectives of Chapter 11 by preventing
unsecured creditors from having their claims usurped by the junior
claims of equity holders.'
The absolute priority rule may not be as absolute as it sounds,
however, because of a judicially created exception known as the "new
value exception," which originated prior to the 1978 enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code?3 The new value exception allows shareholders to
18. See Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy
Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 70 (1991) (explaining the distinct rights of various
creditors); George H. Singer, Supreme Court Clarifies "New Value Exception" to Absolute
Priority Rule-Or Does It?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 1999, at 1, 32. Singer explains that
"at the core of American corporate law is a fundamental ordering between owners of
equity and creditors; creditors must be paid in full in the event of a financial collapse of
the business before holders of equity receive any distribution." Id. This ordering is a
"critical component" of Chapter 11's reorganization provisions. Id.
19. See Railroad Co. v. Howard, 74 U.S. 392, 414-16 (1868) (refusing to allow a
railroad's shareholders to retain their equity in the railroad without fulfilling the claims of
unsecured creditors); infra note 160 and accompanying text (describing the decision in
Howard).
20. See Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry., 174 U.S. 674,
684 (1899) (describing as the "familiar rule" the notion that the claims of unsecured
creditors take precedent over those of shareholders); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228
U.S. 482, 506-07 (1913) (stating that the favoring of unsecured creditors was a "fixed
principle"); infra notes 159-96 and accompanying text (detailing the history of this idea
prior to the codification of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978).
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1994) ("[T]he holder of any claim or interest
that is junior to the claims of such [impaired unsecured] class will not receive or retain
under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest any property.").
22. See id.
23. The origin of the new value exception is traced to Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939). In dicta, the Court reaffirmed the absolute priority rule
while noting that there are circumstances in which prior equity holders may participate in
the reorganized debtor. See id. at 121; see also infra notes 179-87 and accompanying text
(discussing the impact of Los Angeles Lumber).
While the term generally used is "new value exception," some contend this
characterization is incorrect. Rather, they choose to describe it as the new value
"corollary." Bonner Mall Partnership v. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co., 2 F.3d 899, 906-07
(1993) (noting that the new value principle is basically a description of the limitations of
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retain equity in the reorganized debtor in exchange for a capital
contribution.2 4 Unlike the absolute priority rule, however, the new
value exception never has been codified.21 This lack of statutory
recognition has led to much debate over whether the new value
exception survived the codification of the Bankruptcy Code.26
Hanging in the balance is a great deal of bargaining leverage that
would shift between lenders and borrowers depending on whether the
new value exception is viable.27 Should the exception continue to be
recognized, borrowers would be able to retain ownership in
reorganized businesses on the basis of capital contributions, allowing
them to participate more readily in their reorganized ventures. On
the absolute priority rule and therefore should be referred to as a corollary, not by the
misleading term "exception"); In re SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202,225 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993)
(agreeing with the idea that the new value exception "is not an exception at all, but merely
a corollary to the absolute priority rule" and upholding the corollary for that reason); John
D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963, 999 (1989)
(referring to the doctrine as the "new value corollary"); Markell, supra note 18, at 73 ("To
speak of the new value exception as an exception to absolute priority is thus misleading.").
For the sake of consistency in this Note, the term "new value exception" will be used.
24. See Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 121.
25. The new value exception was accepted under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541,
30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978), but the 1898 Act was repealed by the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-
1329 (1994)). See also Harvey R. Miller & John J. Rapisardi, Separate and Unequal: The
Seventh Circuit Isolates and Neutralizes the Undersecured Creditor in In re 203 N. LaSalle
Street Partnership, 28 U. MEM. L. REv. 667, 681-82 (1998) ("Because the Bankruptcy Act
judicially recognized the doctrine but did not codify it under the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 or thereafter, some decisions have held that the new value corollary did not
survive the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code."); Singer, supra note 18, at 32 ("The
existence of an exception or corollary to the rule of absolute priority, while a recognized
principle under the Bankruptcy Act, is not expressly codified in the Bankruptcy Code.").
26. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1129.04[4][c], at 1129-102 (Lawrence P. King
ed., 15th ed. rev. 1999) (describing the validity of the new value exception as "one of the
more hotly contested issues" to have arisen since the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code);
McDermott, supra note 3, at 23-24 (noting the "considerable controversy" that has long
existed over whether § 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code contains a new value exception);
Singer, supra note 18, at 32 (stating that the existence of a new value exception has
"generated a firestorm of debate, analysis, commentary and litigation"); J. Ronald Trost et
al., Survey of the New Value Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule and the Preliminary
Problem of Classification, SD24 ALI-ABA 401, 409 (1998), available in WL, ALI-ABA
database ("The viability of new value plans under the Code has been hotly debated by
courts and commentators.").
27. See Brian A. Basil, The New Value Exception to Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy,
101 COM. L.J. 290,291 (1996) (noting the "tremendous implications" that resolution of the
new value exception will have on the relative bargaining power of parties in Chapter 11
reorganizations); Richard L. Epling, The New Value Exception: Is There a Practical,
Workable Solution?, 8 BANKR. DEv. J. 339, 347 (1991) ("The new value exception is an
important piece of debtor leverage in a Chapter 11 case.").
28. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute
Priority and New Value Contributions, 36 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1052-53 (1987) ("[A] rule
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the other hand, if the exception is not valid, lenders should have an
easier time recovering their money, even over the objections of the
shareholders.29
Commentators viewed Bank of America National Trust &
Savings Association v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership30 as an
opportunity for the Supreme Court to resolve the question of whether
the new value exception continued to exist after the current
Bankruptcy Code was adopted.3 1 This Note will seek to show how the
Court managed to evade the major issue, while deciding the case on
other grounds. First, this Note will review some general principles of
bankruptcy law, explore the facts of Bank of America, including its
lower court history, and discuss the Supreme Court's holding and
rationale.3 2 Next, it will survey the origins of the absolute priority
rule and the new value exception, tracing their development over the
past century.33 The Note then will attempt to explain how the
bankruptcy community can comply with the Bank of America Court's
mandate.3 Finally, this Note will offer some thoughts on the future
of the new value exception, concluding that the issue remains
uncertain.35
Once a debtor has filed for bankruptcy, the next step in a
Chapter 11 reorganization is the filing and subsequent confirmation
permitting new capital from prior owners increases their leverage in negotiation.... The
new [value] theory increases the difficulty for creditors to eliminate ownership, thereby
increasing the owner's leverage.").
29. See McDermott, supra note 3, at 23 (claiming that restricting the application of the
new value exception "shifts the balance of power between debtors and lenders by granting
lenders additional leverage in contested reorganization cases").
30. 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999).
31. See Randolph J. Haines, The Unwarranted Attack on New Value, 72 AM. BANKR.
LJ. 387, 389 (1998) ("The Supreme Court is now apparently set to resolve the issue."); id.
at 393 ("[T]he case should provide a clear, unequivocal answer to the question of whether
the new value rule survived the adoption of the Code."); McDermott, supra note 3, at 25
(noting that, while the Court specifically granted certiorari "to resolve a circuit split on the
issue" of the viability of the new value exception, it instead assumed the existence of the
exception and decided a separate issue); Thomas J. Salerno et al., Urgent Message to the
Supreme Court: 'Just Do It!', 34 No. 6 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LPR) at 1 (May 25, 1999)
(complaining that the case was "supposed, at long last, to resolve the issue"); Singer, supra
note 18, at 1 (stating that the bankruptcy community had hoped the Court would finally
resolve the issue). But see Trost et al., supra note 26, at 452 (explaining that the Court
possibly would choose to address only the narrower issue of the exclusiveness of the
opportunity provided to the debtor, rather than delivering a sweeping ruling on the
validity of the new value exception).
32. See infra notes 36-158.
33. See infra notes 159-208.
34. See infra notes 209-53.
35. See infra notes 254-56.
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of a reorganization plan.36 This plan must identify the borrower's
creditors, group the creditors into classes based on how their claims
are treated under the plan, and describe how each class will be
treated and how the plan will be implemented. A lender whose
claim is secured by an asset of the debtor is deemed to be
"undersecured" when the value of the asset is less then the face value
of the lenders claim.38  According to the Bankruptcy Code, an
undersecured lender is deemed to hold two claims.39 One is a secured
claim equal to the value of the debtor's asset. The other is an
unsecured claim whose value is the difference between the face
amount of the lender's claim and the value of the debtor's asset.
40
Once the claims are classified and a reorganization plan is
proposed, each holder of a claim votes to either accept or reject the
plan, and approval is determined on a class-by-class basis.41 When the
voting is completed, a court must certify that the plan meets the
thirteen basic requirements outlined in the Bankruptcy Code.42 One
of these requirements is that any impaired class of creditors, 43 namely
those whose rights are altered under the plan of reorganization, must
vote to accept the plan.44
Even if all impaired classes do not vote to accept the plan,
however, the debtor may still secure confirmation.4 5 This method of
achieving confirmation over the objection of an impaired class of
36. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a) (1994).
37. See id.
38. McDermott, supra note 3, at 23.
39. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
40. See id. For example, in Bank of America, the Debtor borrowed $93 million on a
loan secured by 15 floors of an office building. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1414-15.
The bankruptcy judge valued the collateral at $54.5 million. See id. at 1415. Thus, the
Bank had a secured claim of $54.5 million and an unsecured claim of $38.5 million, the
difference between the face value of the loan and the value of the collateral. See id. at
1414.
41. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126. A unanimous vote is not required; rather, approval requires
only a dual majority vote. See id. § 1129(c) ("A class of claims has accepted a plan if such
plan has been accepted by creditors ... that hold at least two-thirds in amount or more
than one-half in number of the allowed claims of such class held by creditors ... that have
accepted or rejected such plan.").
42. See id. § 1129(a).
43. A class of claims can be impaired under a plan of reorganization "unless, with
respect to each claim or interest of such class, the plan ... leaves unaltered the legal,
equitable, and contractual rights to which such claim or interest entitles the holder of such
claim or interest." Id. § 1124(1).
44. See id. § 1129(a)(8). Nonimpaired classes of creditors are not required to vote, as
they are "conclusively presumed to have accepted the plan." Id. § 1126(f).
45. See id. § 1129(a)(10).
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creditors is known as a "cramdown. 4 6 To effect a cramdown, two
conditions must be satisfied.47 First, with the exception of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(8), all thirteen elements of § 1129(a) must be fulfilled, 8
including approval of the plan by at least one impaired class of
creditors.49 Second, the Code requires that the plan "not discriminate
unfairly, and [that it be] fair and equitable, with respect to each class
of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the
plan.,
50
The phrase "fair and equitable" is the critical language in the
requirements for a cramdown.51 It is this "fair and equitable"
requirement that invokes the absolute priority rule.52  The Code
requires that one of two conditions be met if a plan is to be deemed
"fair and equitable" to an impaired class of unsecured claims.53 First,
all claims must be paid in full, 4 such that the members of the class
must receive consideration equal to the present value of their entire
claim.55 If all claims are not paid in full, then the plan must meet the
second condition: the absolute priority rule. 6
As codified by federal statute, the absolute priority rule states
that "the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of
such [impaired unsecured] class will not receive or retain under the
plan on account of such junior claim or interest any property. '57
Thus, if the impaired unsecured class is not fully compensated as
required under the Code, then a junior interest may not receive
46. See BAIRD, supra note 3, at 230 (noting that a "cramdown" allows a confirmation
of a reorganization plan over objections of creditors, but requires expensive and unreliable
valuations).
47. See id.
4& See iL (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)).
49. See id (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10)). Because the impaired class of unsecured
trade claims accepted the Debtor's plan, the requirement of § 1129(a)(10) that at least one
impaired class accept the plan was satisfied. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1415-16.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1).
51. See id. § 1129(b).
52- See id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii); TREISTER ET AL., supra note 3, § 9.04(f)(2), at 491.
Under the former Bankruptcy Act, a plan of reorganization was required to be "fair and
equitable." Id. § 9.04(f)(1), at 485. This language was interpreted to embrace the absolute
priority rule. See id. When drafting the new Bankruptcy Code, Congress omitted the "fair
and equitable" standard, deeming it too inflexible and unforgiving to apply to all
reorganization plans. See id. § 9.04(f)(1), at 487. The "fair and equitable" standard,
however, is included in the Code's requirements for a cramdown. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
53. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B).
54. See id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i).
55. See TREISTERETAL., supra note 3, § 9.04(f)(2), at 491.
56. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
57. Id. (emphasis added).
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anything."8 Congress apparently designed the absolute priority rule
so that the only way a class of unsecured creditors could be excluded
unwillingly from receiving full compensation is if the reorganization
value of the debtor, when distributed in order of seniority, runs out
prior to the unsecured claims being fully paid.59
The facts of Bank of America are relatively uncomplicated. A
real estate venture known as 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership
("Debtor" or "Partnership"), owned fifteen floors of a downtown
Chicago office building as its principal asset.' The Partnership owed
Bank of America ("Bank") ninety-three million dollars on a
nonrecourse mortgage secured by its interests in the office building.
61
Once the Debtor defaulted on the loan, the Bank commenced
foreclosure proceedings.62 The Debtor countered by filing for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, thereby
receiving an automatic stay of the foreclosure proceedings. 63
After filing for bankruptcy, the Debtor proposed a
reorganization plan in the prescribed 180-day period within which it
58. See id. § 1129(b)(2)(B).
59. See TREISTERETAL., supra note 3, § 9.04(f)(2), at 491.
60. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1414.
61. See id. A nonrecourse mortgage permits the Bank to look only to the Debtor's
collateral for payment in the event of default; the lender has no recourse against the
borrower personally. See id. at 1414 n.3. Thus, if the Bank chose to foreclose on the office
space, it would not have been entitled to recover on anything beyond the value of the
collateral. See McDermott, supra note 3, at 26. In contrast, under a recourse loan, a
guarantor or endorser is secondarily liable if the borrower defaults. See BLACK'S LAW
DICIONARY 1275 (7th ed. 1999). In that case, the borrower would be liable up to the
value of the collateral, and the guarantor must come up with the rest.
62. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1414.
63. See id. Once a debtor files for bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code provides an
automatic stay of any foreclosure proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994); see also
supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text (discussing the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay
provision).
By filing for bankruptcy, the Debtor was able to postpone almost $20 million in
personal tax liabilities that would arise upon foreclosure by the Bank. See Bank of
America, 119 S. Ct. at 1414. As the bankruptcy court found, the purpose of the
reorganization and new capital contribution was not to allow the Debtor to become
solvent; in fact, the bankruptcy court found that the Debtor would never reach solvency.
See In re 203 N. LaSalle St. Ltd. Partnership, 190 B.R. 567, 588 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995)
(mem.), affd sub nom. Bank of America, Ill. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 195 B.R.
692 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (mem.), affd sub nom. In re 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 126 F.3d
955 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. 203 N.
LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999). Rather, the Debtor hoped to retain its
interest in the partnership because of the tax benefits that would accompany that interest.
See id. Net operating losses associated with a business are a valuable way to reduce future
tax liability, as they can be used to offset future taxable income. See Epling, supra note 27,
at 339 n.10. If the interest in the partnership was lost, then those net operating losses
associated with the partnership would be lost as well. See id.
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had the exclusive right to do so.64 The value of the Debtor's
mortgaged property was only $54.5 million, leaving the Bank with an
unsecured claim of $38.5 million. Because a portion of the claim
was secured and the rest was unsecured, the Bank's claims were
classified separately, along with a third class of unsecured trade
claims totaling $90,000.66 The Debtor's proposed reorganization plan
would pay off the Bank's $54.5 million secured claim with interest
over a period of seven to ten years.67 The Bank, however, only would
receive approximately sixteen percent of the present value of its
unsecured claim of $38.5 million.6s As for the $90,000 unsecured
trade claims, the plan provided for full repayment.69 The plan also
provided that a $6.125 million contribution of new capital be made by
certain partners of the bankrupt Debtor in exchange for the complete
equity interest in the reorganized Debtor. 0
Under the provisions of the Debtor's plan, therefore, two classes
of claims were impaired: the Bank's unsecured claim of $38.5 million
and the trade creditors' claims of $90,000. 11 Although the class of
64. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1414. The Bankruptcy Code initially provides a
120-day period of exclusivity during which the debtor alone may file its plan. See 11
U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1994). This period may be extended to 180 days, however, if the debtor
files a request for an extension within the allotted 120 days. See id. § 1121(c). Here, the
Debtor filed for the extension within the initial period, and it was approved. See In re 203
N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 126 F.3d 955, 958-59 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Bank of
Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. 203 North LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411
(1999).
65. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1415. Under § 1111(b), a nonrecourse secured
creditor who is undersecured is treated in Chapter 11 as if it had recourse. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1111(b)(1)(A) ("A claim secured by a lien on property of the estate shall be allowed or
disallowed under section 502 of this title the same as if the holder of such claim had
recourse against the debtor on account of such claim, whether or not such holder has such
recourse."); Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1414 n.6 (stating the same).
66. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a); Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1414-15.
67. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1415.
68. See itL
69. See i&2
70. See id Partners in the bankrupt Debtor were given the opportunity to contribute
new capital to the reorganized debtor. See id. In return for that new capital, the old
equity holders were to receive an equity interest in the reorganized debtor. See id. This
opportunity was made available exclusively to equity holders in the bankrupt Partnership;
thus, the reorganized debtor would be comprised only of those former partners who made
equity contributions. See id. Over 60% of the partnership would change hands under the
plan. No third parties-in other words, anyone who did not hold an equity share in the
bankrupt partnership-would have been permitted to contribute or to receive an interest
in the reorganized debtor. See id. at 1415 n.11.
71. See id at 1415-16. A class is unimpaired if it retains all prepetition legal,
equitable, and contractual rights against the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1). Thus, the
Bank's claim was impaired because it stood to receive only 16% of the present value of its
claim, and the trade creditors' claim was impaired because they would receive no interest
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trade creditors voted to approve the plan, the Bank rejected the
plan,72 thus preventing consensual confirmation of the plan as
required under Chapter 1. 3 The Debtor then sought to enforce the
plan over the objections of a dissenting class through a cramdown74
The Bank's objection to the reorganization plan focused on the
absolute priority rule75 The Bank claimed that the Debtor's plan
violated the rule because the equity holders of the bankrupt
Partnership who contributed to the reorganized Debtor and whose
claims were junior to those of the creditors would receive property
even though the Bank's unsecured claim was not fully paid.76 This
arrangement was an apparent violation of the absolute priority rule:
the claims of equity holders were junior to those of the Bank, but
those junior claimants were to receive property, namely an interest in
the reorganized Debtor, without all senior claims being satisfied
completely.77 Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court confirmed the
plan,78 as did the district court on appeal.79
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
upheld the lower courts' approval of the plan. 0 In doing so, the
Seventh Circuit noted the ambiguity in the phrase "on account of" as
used in the statute codifying the absolute priority rule.s It read this
language to permit a "new value" corollary to the absolute priority
under the Debtor's proposal. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1415-16.
72. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1415.
73. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (requiring that the reorganization plan be accepted by
each class of impaired creditors).
74. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1415.
75. See id.
76. See Brief for the Petitioner at 8, Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999) (No. 97-
1418).
77. See id.
7M See In re 203 N. LaSalle St. Ltd. Partnership, 190 B.R. 567, 594 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1995) (mem.), affd sub nom. Bank of America, Ill. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 195
B.R. 692 (N.D. IM. 1996) (mem.), affd sub nom. In re 203 N. LaSalle St. Ltd. Partnership,
126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v.
203 North LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999).
79. See Bank of America, 195 B.R. at 716, aff'd sub nom. In re 203 N. LaSalle St. Ltd.
Partnership, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust &
Savings Ass'n v. 203 North LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999). Congress has
granted jurisdiction over bankruptcy claims to United States district courts. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334 (1994). The district courts, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1994), will then refer
these matters to the bankruptcy courts, which are described as a "unit" of the district
court. Id. § 151. Final bankruptcy court orders are then appealable to the district courts.
See id. § 158(a). From there, the courts of appeals have jurisdiction. See id. § 158(d).
80. See In re 203 N. LaSalle SL Partnership, 126 F.3d at 970, rev'd sub nom. Bank of
Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. 203 North LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411
(1999).
81. See id. at 964.
2000] 1199
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
rule.' Although the absolute priority rule states that a junior
claimant cannot receive any property if all senior claimants have not
been fully paid, the new value theory would hold otherwise. 3 As
recognized under pre-1978 practice, the theory holds that by
contributing new capital to a reorganized debtor, a party with a junior
claim may receive or retain property even when all senior claims have
not been satisfied.84
The court of appeals based its decision on its reading of the
statutory absolute priority rule, 5 interpreting the language to mean
that a junior claimant could receive property if it was not received
"on account of' the junior claim or interest.86  Specifically, the
Seventh Circuit held that the junior claimants could retain their
interests in the property if they made a contribution of new value to
the reorganized Debtor.87 In such a situation, the junior claimants
would not be receiving property "on account of' their positions as
prior equity holders but rather "on account of' their contributions of
new capital.' In light of a split among the circuits concerning the
viability of the new value exception, 9 the Supreme Court granted
82. Id. at 965.
83. See id. at 963.
84. See id.
85. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1994).
86. See In re 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 126 F.3d at 964.
87. See id at 966-67.
8& See id. at 966. In dissent, Judge Kanne argued that the plain language of the
absolute priority rule "fails to even hint" at a new value corollary. Id. at 970 (Kanne, J.,
dissenting). According to Judge Kanne, the majority incorrectly inserted the words
"solely or primarily" before "on account of" in the statute. See id. at 972 (Kanne, J.,
dissenting). Thus, the statute would read "'the holder of any claim or interest that is
junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan SOLELY or
PRIMARILY on account of such junior claim or interest any property.'" Id. (Kanne, J.,
dissenting). Judge Kanne felt this interpretation was an inappropriate deviation from the
"otherwise firm rule" of absolute priority. See id. (Kanne, J., dissenting).
The dissent also argued that, assuming the statute was ambiguous, legislative
history was inconclusive and did not support the new value exception. See id. at 973
(Kanne, J., dissenting). Furthermore, because the Bankruptcy Code "so fundamentally
altered" pre-Code practice and procedures, following pre-Code practice might be adverse
to the intentions of Congress. Id. at 974 (Kanne, J., dissenting). In Judge Kanne's view,
the Debtor's plan gave the old equity holders the exclusive right to retain their ownership
in the reorganized debtor because of their status as former equity holders. See id. at 973
(Kanne, J., dissenting). Judge Kanne therefore would follow the plain meaning of the
statute and prohibit such a plan. See id, (Kanne, J., dissenting).
89. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have recognized the existence of the new value
exception, while the Second and Fourth Circuits, although not explicitly rejecting the new
value exception, have rejected new value plans similar to those approved in other circuits,
Compare id. at 965 (recognizing the existence of the new value exception), and Bonner
Mall Partnership v. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co., 2 F.3d 899, 918 (9th Cir. 1993)




In an opinion by Justice Souter, the Court held that pre-
bankruptcy equity holders who wish to contribute new capital in
return for equity in the reorganized entity may not do so over the
objection of a senior class of impaired creditors if: (1) the prior
equity holders have an exclusive opportunity to contribute new
capital; and (2) no alternative plans are considered.9 Although the
majority rejected the reorganization scheme in this case, it explicitly
stated that it would not pass judgment on the validity of the new
value exception.92 Despite its rather limited holding, the Court
engaged in a comprehensive analysis of the language and history of
the absolute priority rule as codified in § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). 93
The Court began by discussing the legislative history behind the
codification of the absolute priority rule.94 Consistent with the
uncertainty surrounding the new value exception, the Court found
that the legislative history on the rule was open to interpretation.95
Both the Bank and the Debtor, for example, interpreted Congress's
attempt in 1973 to overhaul the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as support
for their arguments.96 While it was debating the merits of a new
bankruptcy act in 1973, Congress, amidst widespread disapproval,
Central Three Partners, L.P. v. BT/SAP Pool C Assocs., L.P., 138 F.3d 39, 44-45 (2d Cir.
1998) (disapproving a plan similar to the proposed plan in Bank of America, but not
explicitly rejecting the new value exception), and Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson Properties,
XVIII, 961 F.2d 496, 504 (4th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a plan that gave old shareholders the
exclusive opportunity to retain their equity, while not rejecting the new value exception
per se).
90. See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership,
523 U.S. 1106 (1998).
91. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1424. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Souter in the majority decision.
See id. at 1413. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred only in the judgment,
see id. at 1424-26 (Thomas, J., concurring), while Justice Stevens dissented. See id. at
1426-30 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
92. See id. at 1417 ("We do not decide whether the statute includes a new value
corollary or exception .....
93. See id. at 1417-22.
94. See id. at 1417-19.
95. See id.
96. See Brief for the Petitioner at 26, Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999) (No. 97-
1418) ("The legislative history, in fact, reinforces the clear import of the statutory text:
there is no new value exception to the absolute priority rule."); id. at 32 ("The legislative
history shows that Congress intended to codify the absolute priority rule without a new
value exception."); Brief for Respondent at 37-38, Bank of America (No. 97-1418)
("Congress understood the new value principle to be part of the absolute priority rule
codified in the [old Bankruptcy Act] ... and intended to make no change to that 'black-
letter' principle when it carried the 'fair and equitable' requirement forward into Chapter
11 of the Code.").
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rejected a proposal from the bankruptcy commission intended to
reform the absolute priority rule.97 The commission's proposal would
have permitted prior equity holders to participate in a reorganized
debtor based on a contribution of "continued management ...
essential to business" or other participation beyond "money or
money's worth."98
The Bank, like many opponents of the new value exception,
treated Congress's rejection of the measure as an explicit disavowal of
the new value exception." The Debtor and other supporters of the
new value exception took the opposite view, interpreting these same
circumstances to be evidence that Congress was aware of the new
value exception and that its rejection of this expansion of the
traditional concept of new value was merely an endorsement of the
exception.)°
The Court, although not assessing the validity of either side's
argument, appeared to side with the Debtor. It characterized
Congress's rejection of the proposal as "equivocal," recognizing that
the rejection of this proposed modification to the absolute priority
rule was ambiguous at best.'' Additionally, the Court acknowledged
that the proposed new value rule was a broadened version of the
traditional model,"~ seemingly agreeing with the Debtor that the
rejection of the 1973 proposal was not the same as an outright
rejection of the new value exception as most see it. Most importantly,
the Court noted that "this history does nothing to disparage the
possibility apparent in the statutory text, that the absolute priority
rule now on the books as subsection (b)(2)(B)(ii) may carry a new
97. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1418.
98. ld. (citing H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 258-59 (1973)). This proposal would
have greatly expanded the new value exception by allowing nonmonetary contributions of
new value. See id. Even when the new value exception is upheld, it is limited to money or
money's worth. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197,203 (1987).
99. See Brief for the Petitioner at 27, Bank of America (No. 97-1418); see also In re
203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 126 F.3d 955, 974-76 (7th Cir. 1997) (Kanne, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the legislative history fails to provide any evidence that the new value
exception survived the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code), rev'd sub nom. Bank of Am.
Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. 203 North LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999);
Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1361-62 (7th
Cir. 1990) (noting that the statutory language and legislative history suggest that the new
value exception did not survive).
100. See, e.g., In re Snyder, 967 F.2d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Rather than rejecting
the new value exception wholesale, Congress 'only rejected the Commission's proposed
relaxation of the rule's requirements.' "(quoting Markell, supra note 18, at 103)).




value corollary."'0 While not explicitly rejecting the Bank's
legislative history arguments, this statement certainly left the door
open for the Court to recognize the new value exception.
Turning from a legislative history to a textual analysis, the Court
then examined the meaning of the phrase "on account of'104 by
considering three possible meanings for the phrase.10 5 The first,
endorsed by the Debtor, was that "on account of" means "in
exchange for" or "in satisfaction of. 10 6 The Debtor argued that this
interpretation would resolve any new value problems, °7  thus
permitting the recognition of a new value exception. The old equity
holders' stakes in the reorganized Debtor could then be considered
"in exchange for" the new capital contributions and not "in exchange
for" their old equity interests. 0 8
The Court rejected the "in exchange for" interpretation for both
textual and practical reasons.10 9 An examination of the statutory
language proved unfavorable for the Debtor's preferred
interpretation because the absolute priority rule governs the retention
of property as well as its receipt."0 Thus, a junior claimant is not only
prohibited from receiving property on account of its prior interest,
but also may not retain property on account of its prior interest."'
The Court explained that if "in exchange for" is the proper meaning
for "on account of," then Congress would have used the awkward
terminology of "'retain[ing]' property in exchange for the same
property interest."" 2  The Court found it highly unlikely that
Congress would use such convoluted language."3  In addition,
Congress used the phrase "in exchange for" in another area of the
Bankruptcy Code," 4 so the Court reasoned that Congress would have
employed that specific terminology if that was its intent."5 From a
103. Id.
104. See id. at 1419-22.
105. See id at 1419.
106. Id; See Brief for Respondent at 12-16, Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999)
(No. 97-1418).
107. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1419.
10& See id.
109. See id. at 1420.
110. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1994).
111. See id
112. Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1420.
113. See id.
114. See idU; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(J) (providing that "a plan shall provide
adequate means for implementation, such as issuance of securities of the debtor ... for
cash, for property, for existing securities, or in exchange for claims or interests, or for any
other appropriate purpose").
115. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1420.
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practical standpoint, the Court viewed the "in exchange for"
interpretation as too "manipulable" and ultimately dismissed the
Debtor's preferred explanation as "beset with troubles."" 6
The Court then turned to what it felt was a more common usage
of the phrase "on account of."117 According to the Court, viewing the
Code's language as meaning "because of" is a more sensible approach
because that is how the language is used in numerous other sections
of the Code." The phrase "because of' itself has multiple meanings,
however. For example, consider the hypothetical situation of a junior
claimant who received property under a reorganization plan for three
reasons: (1) claimant was under forty years old; (2) he was married;
and (3) he was a prior equity holder. If the phrase "because of" is
used in applying the absolute priority rule, two possible scenarios
could occur. First, the phrase could take on a direct and absolute
level of causation, as advocated by the Debtor." 9 In that case, the
junior claimant would only violate the absolute priority rule when he
received property directly and solely because of his prior interest.
With a direct level of causation, this junior claimant would be allowed
to retain his property, as he did not receive it solely because of his
prior interest, but also because of his age and marital status.
Alternatively, "because of" could be used in a less direct manner,
implying a "but for" level of causation. In this interpretation, which is
more in line with the Bank's view,20 the junior claimant would violate
the absolute priority rule when his status as a prior equity holder had
any bearing whatsoever on his receiving property. To determine
whether the absolute priority rule was violated, one would ask "but
for the junior claimant's position as a prior equity holder, would he
116. I. at 1419-20.
117. See iL at 1420.
11M See id. For other provisions of the Code using this language, see, for example, 11
U.S.C. § 1111(b)(1)(A) ("A claim secured by a lien on property of the estate shall be
allowed or disallowed under section 502 of the title the same as if the holder of such claim
had recourse against the debtor on account of such claim."), id. § 522(d)(10)(E) ("[A]
payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit sharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract
on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service .... "), id. § 547(b)(2)
("[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property.., for or on
account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made ...."),
id. § 547(c)(4)(B) ("[T]o the extent that ... such creditor gave new value to or for the
benefit of the debtor ... on account of which new value the debtor did not make an
otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor....").
119. See Brief for Respondent at 19-21, Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999) (No
97-1418).
120. While the Bank did not push for "but for" causation in its strictest sense, its
position was much closer to a "but for" level than it was to the Debtor's direct causation.
See Brief for the Petitioner at 21-23, Bank of America (No. 97-1418).
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receive any property?" Here, even though the junior claimant
receives property based on three conditions, he would not have
received any property unless he was a prior equity holder because
that was one of the three requirements. Using a "but for" level of
causation, the junior claimant would not be allowed to retain the
property.
Thus, the Court was faced with determining the appropriate level
of causation for the phrase "because of.'' In an amicus brief, the
United States Government argued in favor of the "but for" approach,
asserting that any degree of causation should invalidate a plan in
which a prior interest ends up with equity, a rigid position the Court
described as "starchy."' Following the Solicitor General's
interpretation would result in a complete prohibition on equity
holders retaining any property over an objecting class of unpaid
senior creditors. 23 The Court explained that such an approach likely
did not reflect Congress's intent, as Congress could have
accomplished the same objective by eliminating the phrase "on
account of" entirely.' 4
The final proposed meaning also involved the phrase "because
of," but uses a more direct level of causation.1' Under this theory,
between the prior interest and property received would exist only if
the new contribution is less than what would have been paid by
another party without a prior interest.2 6 Thus, the contribution
would be invalidated only if it "failed to provide the greatest possible
addition to the bankruptcy estate."' Causation of this type would
certainly be more conducive to new value proposals than would the
Solicitor General's view because this direct causation would
121. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1420. In Bonner Mall Partnership v. U.S.
Bancorp Mortgage Co., 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit recognized the
importance of determining the level of causation. See id. at 909 ("[T]he answer to the
meaning of the phrase 'on account of' lies in the level of causation Congress had in mind
when it prohibited old equity owners from receiving property 'on account of' their prior
interests.").
122. Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1420.
123. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10-16,
Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999) (No. 97-1418); Brief for Respondent at 15-16,
Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999) (No. 97-1418). This argument has been delivered
on two other occasions by previous Solicitors General. See Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae at 15-20, Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988) (No.
86-958); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15-25, U.S.
Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir.1993) (No. 93-714).
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invalidate only the most blatant proposal in which old equity retains
its interest due to its position as a prior interest holder.'2
Because the Debtor's plan would fail on any level of causation,
the Court found it unnecessary to choose among the three
meanings. 9 The Court explained that the plan's fatal flaw was "its
provision for vesting equity in the reorganized business in the
Debtor's partners without extending an opportunity to anyone else
either to compete for that equity or to propose a competing
reorganization plan."'30 Thus, the exclusivity of the reorganization
plan raised the Court's ire.
The Court was particularly troubled by two issues related to the
plan's exclusivity. First, the Court was concerned by the method used
by the old shareholders to freeze out all others from proposing
competing bids.'3' Under § 1121(b), the Debtor had a 120-day period
of exclusivity (which was extended to 180 days) during which it was
the only party who could propose a plan of reorganization. The
Debtor took advantage of this situation, however, and proposed a
plan under which members of the Debtor had the sole right to retain
equity in the reorganized Debtor.33 According to the Court, this plan
amounted to the Debtor's exercise of an exclusive option to retain
interest in the new firm.YM Such an option has value and should itself
be treated as property. 35 If treated as property, the option would
constitute property received "on account of" an old equity interest
and would violate the absolute priority rule. 6
The Court's second concern involving the exclusivity of the
Debtor's plan was rooted in the underlying policies of Chapter 11.
Exclusivity prevents the market from placing an appropriate value on
12. See Brief for Respondent at 19-21, Bank of America (No. 97-1418).
129. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1422.
130. Id.
131. See id
132. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (describing the statutory provisions
behind the 120-day period of exclusivity).
133. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1422.
134. See id
135. See id.; cf. Coltex Loop Central Three Partners, L.P. v. BTISAP Pool C Assocs.,
L.P., 138 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[T]he exclusive right to retain the debtor's property
upon making a capital contribution is itself property."); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson
Properties, XVIII, 961 F.2d 496, 504 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that the exclusive right to
contribute capital in return for retaining equity is property under 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1994) "received or retained on account of a prior interest"); Kham &
Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1360 (7th Cir. 1990)
(asserting that an option to purchase stock is property under § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)).
136. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
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the firm.137 By making this opportunity available exclusively to those
with a prior interest, the reorganization plan ensured that there would
be no way of knowing whether the amount contributed as new capital
was the maximum amount that could be raised in the market.1
38
Consequently, the determination of whether the former equity
holders paid the full price was left to the bankruptcy judge, whose
valuation expertise was inferior to the market's.1 39 Ensuring that the
market is the mechanism that determines the value of the firm would
help to preserve businesses as going concerns and to maximize the
property available to creditors, as old shareholders would be forced
to pay at least as high a price as anyone else would pay.14° According
137. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1423.
138. See id at 1423.
139. See id.; see also BAIRD, supra note 3, at 250 (noting that shareholders, who possess
greater information about a company than even the most diligent bankruptcy judge, will
be in a better position to value their firm); cf. Markell, supra note 18, at 73
("Reorganization practice illustrates that the presence of competing bidders for a debtor,
whether they are owners or not, tends to increase creditor dividends.").
140. The Court stated that a "less absolute" reading of the "on account of" language in
the statute would reconcile the two main policies of Chapter 11: preserving the going
concern and maximizing the property available to satisfy creditors. See Bank of America,
119 S. Ct. at 1421; see also Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163 (1991) (reciting the
underlying objectives of a Chapter 11 reorganization). The Bank of America Court
outlined this interpretation of "on account of," stating that the requisite causation "would
presumably occur" when old equity retains property at a price that "failed to provide the
greatest possible addition to the bankruptcy estate, and it would always come at a price
too low when the equity holders obtained or preserved an ownership interest for less than
someone else would have paid." Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1421.
Adopting such a heightened level of causation as the threshold for rejecting a
reorganization plan would further these two policies of Chapter 11. The infusion of new
capital and the advantages of continuous ownership help to satisfy the goal of preserving
the company as a going concern. Property available to creditors also would be maximized
because, by definition, the old shareholders would be forced to pay more than someone
else would pay. Thus, the problems that could arise from the recognition of a new value
exception do not seem relevant under this level of causation. Because the old
shareholders are forced to pay fair market value to retain their equity in the reorganized
company, it is not likely that these old shareholders will be able to take unfair advantage
of the debtor's senior creditors. Although the Court appeared to lean towards this policy-
oriented level of causation, it stopped short of expressly adopting it. See id. at 1422.
Adopting this policy-based interpretation of "on account of" would solve a
problem inherent in new value cases that arises after the bankruptcy judge places a value
on a firm. Although a bankruptcy judge may be excellent at valuing firms, his estimate
likely will not be as accurate as the shareholders', who have a stake in the business and are
kept constantly apprised of the firm's value. See BAIRD, supra note 3, at 250. Because of
the shareholders' advantage in valuation expertise, a reorganization process that includes
a new value exception is subject to be taken advantage of by the old shareholders. Baird
demonstrates this with an analysis of the decision making process of debtors who have just
learned the value of their bankrupt firm. Suppose the bankruptcy judge values the firm at
one million dollars. If the true value of the firm is less than one million dollars, then the
shareholders will not propose to retain any equity in the firm, as they would not pay more
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to the Court, if a market valuation was used, exclusivity would serve
no legitimate purpose.141 Prior equity holders would not need the
protection of exclusivity if they paid the highest price available.14 2 If
the prior equity holder does not pay the best price, then there is no
reason to confer exclusive retention of equity upon him.'43 Because
the reorganization plan in Bank of America granted the old
shareholders the exclusive right, free from any market valuation, to
contribute new capital in return for equity in the reorganized Debtor,
the old shareholders were receiving property-namely, the exclusive
right to purchase equity-"on account of" their prior interest and
over the objection of an unpaid senior creditor.144 This exclusivity
was the defect that caused the Debtor's plan to violate the absolute
priority rule.145
Although the majority of the Court refused to take a stand on
the existence of the new value exception, the remaining Justices
argued that a definitive pronouncement should be made as to the
viability of the exception. In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas
stated that there was undoubtedly some degree of causation implied
in the phrase "on account of" as used in the absolute priority rule.
46
Additionally, Justice Thomas contended, it was just as clear that the
old equity holders received at least two forms of property under the
plan: (1) the exclusive option to retain their equity; and (2) the equity
in the reorganized Debtor.47 Therefore, he reasoned, at a minimum,
the exclusive option was obtained "on account of' the old equity
than the firm is worth. If the firm is worth more than one million dollars, however, the
shareholders certainly will offer that sum as new value and hope to retain an interest in the
undervalued firm. In that case, the shareholders would be using their superior
information about the firm's value to exploit any unpaid senior creditors. See id., at 250-
51. The policy-oriented level of causation described by the Court would resolve this issue,
because the price paid by the old shareholders would be the maximum that any party
would pay. The creditors' interests are again protected, and all parties would likely
benefit from the reorganization. See id
141. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1422-23. As the Court explained, "[I]f the
price to be paid for the equity is the best obtainable, old equity does not need the
protection of exclusiveness (unless to trump an equal offer from someone else); if it is not
the best, there is no apparent reason for giving old equity a bargain." Id. Thus, the Court
noted that there was no reason for the Debtor's plan to invoke exclusivity "unless the very
purpose of the whole transaction is, at least in part, to do old equity a favor." Id.
142. See ic-
143. See id.
144. See id. at 1423. But see infra notes 153-58 and accompanying text (discussing
Justice Stevens's dissent, which characterized the exclusive opportunity as a function of
the procedural aspects of the Bankruptcy Code).
145. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1424.
146. See id. at 1424 (Thomas, J., concurring).
147. See id- (Thomas, J., concurring).
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interest, so the plan should not be confirmed. 1' Viewing the new
value exception as originating in nonbinding dicta that had never
been employed by the Court, Justice Thomas urged the Court to
definitively pronounce the new value exception dead and explained
that the majority opinion "only thickens the fog."'149
In dissent, Justice Stevens also implored the Court to resolve any
new value questions, but would have affirmed both the Debtor's plan
and the court of appeals' interpretation of the absolute priority
rule.50 According to Justice Stevens, the new value exception stands
for the idea that a junior claimant may only receive equity in a
reorganized debtor if the claimant's new capital contribution does not
come at a bargain price.' Therefore, if the new value contribution is
equivalent to or of greater value than the junior claimant's interest in
the reorganized firm, the new equity is "on account of" the new
contribution and not "on account of" the claimant's prior interest.
Justice Stevens's dissent also criticized the majority's complaint
that the "exclusive opportunity" obtained by the old equity holders
was the fatal flaw in the reorganization plan. 53 He argued that this
opportunity was not an unfair advantage gained by the old
shareholders, but rather a function of three procedural aspects of the
Bankruptcy Code' 54: (1) the statutorily mandated period of
exclusivity during which only the debtor may propose a
reorganization plan; (2) the refusal by the bankruptcy judge to allow
the bank to file a competing plan; and (3) the inability of the judge to
approve multiple plans. 55 Because he saw no reason to doubt the
bankruptcy judge's valuation of the Debtor' 56 and found the supposed
"exclusive opportunity" to be a product of the Bankruptcy Code,15
Justice Stevens would have approved the Debtor's plan. 58
148. See id. at 1425 (Thomas, J., concurring).
149. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas chastised the majority for its
"unnecessary speculation" in discussing the United States' argument, as well as the
majority's comments advocating a market test for determining the firm's value. See id, at
1424-25 (Thomas, J., concurring). He also criticized the majority's reliance on legislative
history and pre-Bankruptcy Code practice in resolving current questions of interpreting
the Code. See id. at 1425-26 (Thomas, J., concurring).
150. See id. at 1427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152 See id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. See id. at 1428 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. See id. at 1429-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra note 64 and accompanying text
(discussing the statutory exclusivity period found in 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1994)).
156. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1427-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. See id. at 1429-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 1430 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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A review of the background law leading up to Bank of America
provides insight to the Court's struggle with the new value exception.
Prior to the codification of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, a line of
cases appeared to allow debtors some leeway in their efforts to
participate in the reorganized company.5 9 Northern Pacific Railway
Co. v. Boyd was one of the first cases to allude to this possibility.16
159. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 121 (1939) (stating in
dicta that old equity holders may, when necessary, retain their equity in the reorganized
firm in exchange for a capital contribution); Kansas City Terminal R.R. Co. v. Central
Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445, 446 (1926) (noting that prior equity holders may retain
their interests in the reorganized company when their contribution is fundamental to the
success of the new firm, provided the priority of creditors over stockholders is not
impaired); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 508 (1913) (stating that prior
equity holders may obtain an interest in the reorganized debtor if they make a fair offer to
unsecured creditors).
160. 228 U.S. 482 (1913). Two cases preceding Boyd developed the concept of
absolute priority. In Railroad Co. v. Howard, 74 U.S. 392 (1868), Chicago & Rock Island
Co. offered to purchase a failing railroad for $5.5 million. See id. at 393. Although this
price was less than the $7 million owed to secured creditors, it was greater than the
railroad was supposedly worth. See id. In an effort to avoid paying the unsecured
creditors, Rock Island met with the secured creditors and the shareholders and arranged a
complicated transaction involving the creation of a third-party corporation that would
purchase the railroad at a foreclosure sale. See id. at 394-95. This third-party corporation
would then merge with Rock Island, giving Rock Island full title in the railroad. See id.
The proceeds from the sale would then be distributed to the secured creditors (84% of the
proceeds) and the shareholders of the failing railroad (16%). See id. at 396-97. The
railroad's unsecured creditors sued, claiming that this transaction was basically a
prearranged sale and the proceeds distributed to the shareholders actually belonged to the
railroad, which would mean the unsecured creditors had access to those proceeds over the
shareholders. See id. at 403. The secured creditors and shareholders disagreed, claiming
that the price paid for the railroad was less than the amount of secured claims, so there
was nothing left over for the unsecured claimants. See id. at 398. The shareholders then
argued that the money received by the secured creditors was theirs alone, and they could
give it away to the shareholders, anyone else they chose, or keep it for themselves. See id.
at 398-99. The Court sided with the unsecured claimants, holding that "[e]quity regards
the property of a corporation as held in trust for the payment of the debts of the
corporation" and that "stockholders are not entitled to any share ... until all the debts of
the corporation are paid." Id. at 409-10. No inside group would be allowed to deprive the
unsecured creditors of their rightful positions to the benefit of the shareholders. See id. at
414-16.
Following Howard, the Court reiterated its position on the rights of unsecured
creditors in Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway. 174 U.S.
674 (1899). In Louisville Trust, a friendly creditor of New Albany entered into a
foreclosure sale agreement with the railroad that would provide compensation for secured
creditors and shareholders, but not unsecured creditors. See id. at 676-80. The railroad
entered into this transaction in hopes of avoiding large liability for its guarantee of another
railroad's bonds. See id. at 675-76. Unsecured creditors brought suit, claiming the sale
was fraudulent in that it provided for shareholders without providing for unsecured
creditors. See id. at 679-80. The Court agreed, stating that any foreclosure that attempts
to preserve the rights of prior equity must first satisfy the rights of its creditors. See id. at
683-84. After repeating the "familiar rule" that the equity's interest is subordinate to the
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Boyd was an unsecured creditor of a failing railroad that underwent a
reorganization. 6' The secured creditors of the railroad were also the
railroad's shareholders. 62 In the reorganization, the secured creditors
and shareholders structured the plan in a way that allowed them to
retain ownership and exclude the unsecured creditors. 163 Thus, while
there was a change in ownership, the new ownership group was made
up of substantially the same investors as the previous group."
Because the reorganization plan voided his interests, Boyd challenged
the plan.
The Court invalidated the transaction on the basis that the
exclusion of the unsecured creditors was improper. 65 The Court
stated that if the reorganization did not provide for all creditors, then
any creditor that was not provided for "could assert his superior
rights" against the interests of the old shareholders. 66 This statement
simply restated the absolute priority rule, which the Court noted was
a "fixed principle" that it was obligated to follow.167 The Court
hinted, however, that a new value concept may be a part of the
absolute priority rule. In doing so, the Court noted that, the
objection of an unsecured creditor notwithstanding, prior equity
holders may be allowed to claim ownership in the reorganized debtor
if the equity holder makes a "fair offer" to the unsecured creditor:
6s
The Court noted that this "fair offer" need not be cash and ruled that
income bonds or preferred stock, provided they are issued on
"equitable terms," would be sufficient to preserve the creditor's
interests. 69 Boyd's holding, while affirming the absolute priority rule,
also left room for future cases to address the concept of new value.70
rights of creditors, the Court held that "any arrangement of the parties by which the
subordinate rights and interests of the stockholders are attempted to be secured at the
expense of the prior rights of either class of creditors comes within judicial denunciation."
Id. at 684.
161. See Boyd, 228 U.S. at 501; Northern Pac. Ry Co. v. Boyd, 177 F. 804, 808 (9th Cir.
1910).
162. See Boyd, 228 U.S. at 506.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 506-07.
165. See id at 508.
166. Id. at 504.
167. Id. at 506-07.
16& let at 508.
169. Id.
170. The four dissenting justices in Boyd fully embraced a new value exception. See ide
at 511-13 (Lurton, J., dissenting). Justice Lurton argued that the absolute priority rule
should not be absolute, but rather should be applied only after a fact-based inquiry into
the circumstances in each case. See id. at 511 (Lurton, J., dissenting). This inquiry should
focus on how the shareholders' participation affects the creditors. See id. (Lurton, J.,
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The Court again recognized the possibility that old equity may
retain ownership in Kansas City Terminal Railroad Co. v. Central
Union Trust Co.'7 1 Kansas City Terminal involved a challenge by a
group of unsecured creditors to a reorganization plan that allowed
stockholders of the insolvent company to retain equity interests even
though unsecured creditors were not fully paid.72  The Court
followed the path taken by Boyd, acknowledging the need for "rigid
adherence" to the absolute priority rule. It did admit, however, that
this "rigid adherence" does not "require the impossible" and demand
that all unsecured claims be fully paid in cash before old equity can
retain ownership.73  According to the Court, when necessary,
unsecured creditors may be protected through other arrangements
that recognize their preferred status to the old shareholders and allow
the unsecured creditors to avail themselves of their right of absolute
priority. 74 Thus, the Court seemed to allow prior equity holders to
maintain an interest in a reorganized company when the reorganized
firm is in dire need of additional funds, and such funds are not likely
to be received unless the old stockholders are allowed to contribute
and retain their interests. 75 The essential nature of contributions
from old equity, combined with the understanding that these
contributions are unlikely to come unless the contributors are allowed
to retain their equity interests, led the Court to adopt a holding that
reaffirmed the absolute priority rule while still being receptive to
contributions of new value.176
Eight years after the Court's decision in Kansas City Terminal,
Congress amended the 1898 Bankruptcy Act 177 to require that
proposed reorganization plans be "fair and equitable" with respect to
each creditor before the plan could be confirmed. 78 The Court soon
dissenting). Here, Justice Lurton felt that the $11 million contribution made by the
shareholders was essential to the success of the reorganization and that it would actually
benefit the creditors. See id. at 513 (Lurton, J., dissenting).
171. 271 U.S. 445 (1926).
172 See id at 451. The plan compensated both unsecured creditors and shareholders
with new securities in the reorganized debtor. See id. While shareholders were forced to
pay for their securities, the securities were of equal grade. See id. at 452. The plan drew
the ire of unsecured creditors because the shareholders were receiving property, while the
unsecured creditors had not been fully compensated for their claims. See id.
173. Id at 454.
174. See id at 454-55.
175. See id. at 455.
176. See id at 455-56.
177. Act of June 7,1934, ch. 424, § 77(B), 48 Stat. 911,912 (repealed 1978).
178. Act of August 27, 1935, ch. 774, § 77(e)(1), 49 Stat. 911, 918 (repealed 1938). In
1938, just four years after it was enacted, Congress enacted the Chandler Act
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, replacing § 77(B) with Chapter X. See Chandler Act
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had an opportunity to interpret the "fair and equitable" standard in
Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.7 9 In Los Angeles Lumber,
the old equity holders proposed a plan in which they would offer their
managerial ability, familiarity with the business, and community
standing as consideration in exchange for equity in the reorganized
company. 80  The Court rejected this plan as inconsistent with the
statute's "fair and equitable" standard, explaining that management's
proposed contributions were intangible and "reflect[ed] merely vague
hopes or possibilities.' 8' The Court, however, fell short of creating a
blanket prohibition on the efforts of old equity holders to retain their
shares of a reorganized debtor.
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, stated that there are
"circumstances under which stockholders may participate in a plan of
reorganization of an insolvent debtor."'18 Relying on Kansas City
Terminal, he recognized that there are situations in which new capital
is vital to the reorganization efforts and the old shareholders may be
the only ones willing to provide it.'83 Accordingly, Justice Douglas
noted, "[w]here that necessity exists and the old stockholders make a
fresh contribution and receive in return a participation reasonably
equivalent to their contribution, no objection can be made."'" Such
contributions must be in "money or in money's worth," and the
participation of the stockholders must be "reasonably equivalent" to
their capital contributions.Y The Court's framework for allowing old
shareholders to retain equity in the reorganized firm became known
of 1938, ch. 575, §§ 101-276, 52 Stat. 840, 883-905 (repealed 1978). Because the debtor in
Los Angeles Lumber filed its reorganization plan under § 77(B), however, the Court
decided the matter under that section. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308
U.S 106, 108-09 (1939); see also infra notes 188-96 and accompanying text (describing the
ramifications of Chapter X in regards to absolute priority cases).
179. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
180. See id. at 112-13.
181. Id. at 122-23.
182. ld. at 121.
183. See id Justice Douglas's reliance on Kansas City Terminal may have been
misplaced, however. See BAIRD, supra note 3, at 249. In Kansas City Terminal, the
bankrupt firm was worth less than what the most senior creditor was owed. See 271 U.S.
445, 450-51 (1926). The senior creditor hoped to freeze out the general creditors, while
allowing the old shareholders to retain their positions in the reorganized firm. See iL at
451. While Los Angeles Lumber involved a group of shareholders attempting to impose
themselves on unwilling creditors, Kansas City Terminal involved a group of senior
creditors seeking to exclude their junior counterparts. See BAIRD, supra note 3, at 249.
The three-party scenario in Kansas City Terminal may not stand for the concept that old
equity holders may remain in place over the objection of its creditors. See id.
184. Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 121.
185. Id. at 122.
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as the "new value exception" to the absolute priority rule.1 86 Despite
acknowledging the necessity of new value, the Court rejected the
debtor's plan because the shareholders' contributions were not "of
money's worth."'"
Several decisions in the 1940s reaffirmed the holding of Los
Angeles Lumber,"8 but there was not a great deal of activity involving
new value in the decades that followed. 189 This inactivity was largely
due to the congressional replacement of section 77(B) of the
Bankruptcy Act, the section under which Los Angeles Lumber was
filed, with Chapter X.190  The new amendment changed
reorganization practice in two major ways. First, it gave the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) the duty to review and
to give an opinion on virtually all corporate reorganizations.191
Second, it required the appointment of a disinterested trustee, rather
than the interested debtor, to develop reorganization plans.1 2 The
appointment of the disinterested trustee, along with SEC oversight,
ensured that shareholder participation in reorganizations would be
minimal.193 These burdens made Chapter XI a much more attractive
186. TREISTERETAL., supra note 3, § 9.04(f)(2), at 491.
187. Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 121-22 ("[T]he stockholder's participation must
be based on a contribution in money or in money's worth, reasonably equivalent in view of
all the circumstances to the participation of the stockholder.").
188. See Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R.,
318 U.S. 523, 542 (1943) (noting that the fair and equitable standard set forth in Los
Angeles Lumber was correctly applied); Marine Harbor Properties, Inc. v. Manufacturers
Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78, 85 (1942) (holding that a reorganization plan that allows old equity
to participate in the reorganized debtor without making a new capital contribution is not
"fair and equitable" as defined in Los Angeles Lumber); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v.
DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 527 (1941) (acknowledging Los Angeles Lumber as the standard for
determining what is "fair and equitable"); Markell, supra note 18, at 85 (acknowledging
that the Los Angeles Lumber interpretation of "fair and equitable" was soon approved by
several Supreme Court decisions).
189. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 26, 1129.04[4][c], at 1129-106
(noting the decline in the number of likely candidates for application of new value
principles); Markell, supra note 18, at 87 (describing the lack of challenges to the absolute
priority rule from Los Angeles Lumber until a 1970s congressional review of the
bankruptcy laws).
190. See Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, §§ 101-276, 52 Stat. 883-905 (repealed 1978).
191. See iL §§ 172-173, 52 Stat. at 890-91 (stating that a judge must, when debts are
over $3 million, and may, when debts are under $3 million, send a report to the SEC for
review before approving a reorganization plan).
192. See id. § 156, 52 Stat. at 888 (directing the court to appoint an independent trustee
if the debt exceeds $250,000).
193. See Walter W. Miller, Jr., Bankruptcy's New Value Exception: No Longer a
Necessity, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 975, 1000-01 (1997) (asserting that the requirements of Chapter
X meant that shareholder participation to the detriment of creditors only occurred in
"cases of true necessity").
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alternative for those filing a reorganization plan.194 Because the new
burdens did not apply under Chapter XI, however, Congress removed
the "fair and equitable" requirement from Chapter X in 1952. The
removal meant that the absolute priority rule no longer applied to
Chapter XI reorganizations. 195 The reluctance of most debtors to file
under Chapter X, combined with the removal of the absolute priority
rule from Chapter XI, meant that Los Angeles Lumber had few
challengers until Congress chose to rewrite the bankruptcy laws in the
early 1970s.6
Congress began revising the legislation in the 1970s, culminating
with the passage of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.1 The fair and
equitable standard used to invoke the absolute priority rule was
inserted into the Code, but only as a prerequisite for a cramdown and
not as a general requirement for consensual confirmations.198
Although the idea of a new value exception to the absolute priority
rule had been present since Los Angeles Lumber, the final statute did
not contain any reference to such an exception.199
The Supreme Court had an occasion to resolve this uncertainty
in the 1988 case Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers.2 In Ahlers,
the debtors, who were farmers, proposed a reorganization plan in
which they would retain their interest in the farm in return for their
future labor, experience, and expertise.20' The Eighth Circuit
approved this plan, viewing the proposed contribution as "new value"
permitted under the new value exception. The Supreme Court
reversed, deciding that "sweat equity" did not constitute "money or
194. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 26, 1129.04[4][c], at 1129-106
("Although Chapter X retained the fair and equitable requirement, it mandated the
appointment of a disinterested trustee. This factor at least partially explains the
preference, from 1938 to the Code's adoption in 1978, for filing under Chapter XI rather
than under Chapter X.").
195. See Pub. L. No. 82-456, § 35, 66 Stat. 420, 433 (1953); 7 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 26, 1129.04[4][c], at 1129-106; Markell, supra note 18, at 87,
92 n.152.
196. See Markell, supra note 18, at 87. In fact, before the Code's adoption in 1978, no
reported case adopted the new value dicta from Los Angeles Lumber. See 7 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 26, 1129.0414][c], at 1129-106.
197. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1329 (1994).
198. See id. § 1129(b)(1).
199. James J. White, Absolute Priority and New Value, 8 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 1, 6
(1991).
200. 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
201. See id. at 199.
202. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 402-03 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Northwest Bank
Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
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money's worth" as required by Los Angeles Lumber.2°3 The Court,
however, refused to rule on the existence of the new value exception.
Rather, it stated that even if a new value exception had survived the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor's proposed
contribution did not fall within the new value requirements
°4
The Court's refusal to take a position on the existence of the new
value exception caused significant division among lower courts. °5
The circuits were split on the question, with the Seventh and Ninth
203. Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 204.
204. See id. at 203-04 n.3 ("Thus, our decision today should not be taken as any
comment on the continuing vitality of the... [new value] exception.").
205. A number of courts explicitly or implicitly approved the new value exception. See
In re Homestead Partners, Ltd., 197 B.R. 706, 710-15 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996); In re Haas,
195 B.R. 933, 939 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 162 F.3d 1087 (11th Cir.
1998); In re Gramercy Twins Assocs., 187 B.R. 112, 126 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re
Beaver Office Products, Inc., 185 B.R. 537, 541 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995); In re Trevarrow
Lanes, Inc., 183 B.R. 475,494, (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995); State St. Bank v. Elmwood, Inc.,
182 B.R. 845, 852 (D. Nev. 1995); In re Rocha, 179 B.R. 305, 307 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995);
In re 8315 Fourth Ave. Corp., 172 B.R. 725, 737 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994); In re Dean, 166
B.R. 949, 955 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1994); In re Short, 173 B.R. 946, 949 (Bankr. E.D. Okla.
1994); In re Baseline-Dobson Ctr. Real Estate Ltd., 193 B.R. 284, 289 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1994); Coones v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 168 B.R. 247, 252 (D. Wyo. 1994); In
re SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202, 225 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993); FGH Realty Credit Corp. v.
Newark Airport/Hotel Ltd., 155 B.R. 93, 101 n.8 (D.NJ. 1993); In re Eitemiller, 149 B.R.
626,630 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993); In re Ropt Ltd. Partnership, 152 B.R. 406,412 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1993); In re F.A.B. Indus., 147 B.R. 763, 769 (C.D. Cal. 1992); In re Sovereign
Group 1985-27, Ltd., 142 B.R. 702, 706 (E.D. Pa. 1992); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
supra note 26, 1129.04[4][c], at 1129-103 & n.149.
A few courts also rejected the new value exception. See In re Ribs Auto Sales,
Inc., 140 B.R. 390, 395 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992); Piedmont Assocs. v. CIGNA Property &
Cas. Ins. Co., 132 B.R. 75, 79 (N.D. Ga. 1991); In re Embassy Enters. of St. Cloud, 125
B.R. 552, 554 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991); In re Drimmel, 108 B.R. 284, 288 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1989), affd, 135 B.R. 410, 415 (D. Kan. 1991); In re Winters, 99 B.R. 658, 663 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1989); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 26, 1129.04[4][c], at 1129-103
& n.149.
Finally, there were also courts that expressed uncertainty over whether the new
value exception exists. See In re BMW Group I, Ltd., 168 B.R. 731, 734 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. 1994); In re D&W Realty Corp., 156 B.R. 140, 145 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd on
other grounds, 165 B.R. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); In re Miami Ctr. Assocs., 144 B.R. 937, 942
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992); In re Holiday Assocs. Partnership, 139 B.R. 711,716 (Bankr. S.D.
Iowa 1992); In re 495 Cent. Park Ave. Corp., 136 B.R. 626, 632 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In
re Modem Steel Treating Co., 130 B.R. 60, 64 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991); In re Executive
House Assocs., 99 B.R. 266, 281 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Perdido Motel Group, Inc.,
101 B.R. 289,292 n.4 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989); In re Chandler, 98 B.R. 516,518 (Bankr. D.
Mont. 1988); In re Food City, Inc., 94 B.R. 91, 94 n.7 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988); In re
Atlanta West VI, 91 B.R. 620, 627 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988); In re Maropa Marine Sales
Serv. & Storage, Inc., 90 B.R. 544, 545 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988); In re Rudy Debruycker
Ranch, Inc., 84 B.R. 187,189 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1988); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra
note 26, 1129.04[4][c], at 1129-103 & n.150.
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Circuits permitting a new value exception,"6 and the Second and
Fourth Circuits rejecting plans involving new value, though not
expressly repudiating the exception. 7 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari for Bank of America in order to resolve the circuit split. °0
Observers of bankruptcy practice welcomed the Court's decision
to hear Bank of America as a sign that it would finally determine
whether a new value exception to the absolute priority rule exists.
The Court, however, failed to deliver what many hoped would be a
206. Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have explicitly upheld the new value
exception. In Bonner Mall Partnership v. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co., the Ninth Circuit
focused on the idea that the new value exception is not really an exception, but is in fact a
corollary of the absolute priority rule. 2 F.3d 899, 906-07 (9th Cir. 1993); see also supra
note 23 and accompanying text (describing the new value doctrine as a corollary rather
than an exception). Although the Ninth Circuit discussed a myriad of reasons as to why
new value is viable, the key issue was whether the contribution from old equity satisfied
the five requirements of new value. According to the Bonner Mall court, new value must
be: (1) new; (2) substantial; (3) in money or money's worth; (4) necessary for a successful
reorganization; and (5) reasonably equivalent to the value or interest received. See
Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d at 908-09. In the view of the Ninth Circuit, these five
requirements will, if applied properly, ensure that a new value plan will not violate the
absolute priority rule and should benefit the creditors as well. See id. at 916. The Ninth
Circuit rejected the Fourth Circuit's claim that granting shareholders the exclusive
opportunity to contribute new value and retain their interests violates the absolute priority
rule. See id. at 910-11; see supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text (discussing the
Seventh Circuits approval of the new value exception in In re 203 N. LaSalle St.
Partnership, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust &
Savings Ass'n v. 203 North LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999)).
207. Both Travelers Insurance Company v. Bryson Properties, XVIII, 961 F.2d 496, 504
(4th Cir. 1992) and Coltex Loop Central Three Partners, L.P. v. BT/SAP Pool C Assocs.,
L.P., 138 F.3d 39, 44 (2nd Cir. 1998), held that the absolute priority rule prohibits
confirmation of new value plans during the exclusivity period. Each case focused on
bankruptcy plans' provisions for granting the debtors the exclusive rights to retain their
interests by contributing new value to reorganized debtors. See Bryson, 961 F.2d at 404;
Coltex Loop, 138 F. 3d at 44. In Coltex Loop, the Second Circuit expressly followed the
plain meaning approach used in Bryson. See Coltex Loop, 138 F.3d at 42. The similarities
between the Second Circuit's Coltex Loop opinion and the Fourth Circuit's Bryson
opinion are no coincidence; the same judge authored both opinions. Judge Jane A.
Restani, a judge for the United States Court of International Trade, sat by designation in
both cases. See id., 138 F.3d at 40; Bryson, 961 F.2d at 498.
208. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1416. Most of the other circuits have failed to
take a definitive stand on the validity of the new value exception. See Unruh v. Rushville
State Bank, 987 F.2d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir. 1993); John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Route 37 Bus. Park Assocs., 987 F.2d 154,162 n.12 (3d Cir. 1993); In re Lumber Exchange
Bldg. Ltd. Partnership, 968 F.2d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1992); In re Greystone III Joint
Venture, 948 F.2d 134, 142 (5th Cir. 1991), modified, 948 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam); Anderson v. Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul, 913 F.2d 530, 532-33 (8th Cir. 1990);
In re Blankemeyer, 861 F.2d 192, 194 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); 7 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 26, 1129.04[4][c], at 1129-102 & n.148.
209. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (noting that many commentators
expected the Court to rule definitively on the existence of the new value exception).
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resolution to this debate 10 The majority ignored the wishes of
Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Stevens to take a definite stand on the
issue and instead remained content to straddle the fence, just as in
Ahlers.211 Nevertheless, the fact that the Court refused to provide a
conclusive answer does not mean that the decision in Bank of
America was uninformative.
The Court's major qualm with the Debtor's plan was the
exclusive opportunity it gave members of the bankrupt Partnership to
retain their interests in exchange for contributions of new value.2 2
Two aspects of this exclusivity concerned the Court. First, the Court
viewed the partners' exclusive opportunity to make a capital
contribution as exercising an option to retain its interest in the
reorganized Debtor 3 This exclusivity infringed upon the absolute
priority rule, as the exclusive option was property received "on
account of" their prior interests.214 The Court's second concern was
the negative impact that exclusivity would have on determining the
proper value of the firm.2 5 Because a true market valuation could
not be ascertained, there would be no way of knowing whether the
price paid by old equity to retain their interests was the best possible
price attainable.216 For a new value plan to have any chance at being
confirmed, it must appease the Court's worries over these two issues.
210. Some commentators were openly critical of the Court for sidestepping what they
viewed as the crucial issue. See McDermott, supra note 3, at 26 (calling the Court's
decision a "major disappointment" for its failure to resolve the new value controversy, as
well as for the lack of guidance as to how to conduct a market valuation); id. at 27 (stating
that the Court's unwillingness to resolve this issue "demonstrates just how far out of touch
the Court can be with the realities of everyday practitioners"); Judith Greenstone Miller &
John C. Murray, The "New Value" Exception: Myth or Reality After Bank of America
National Trust & Savings Association v. 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership?, 104 COM. L.J.
147, 149-50 (1999) ("It is, therefore, unfortunate that the Court, when faced with the
opportunity to resolve the issue, failed to finally end the debate .... "); Salerno et al.,
supra note 31, at I (commenting that the Court managed to "dodge the issue" and stating
that "[t]he Supreme Court's decision is as satisfying as watching the Star Wars prequel on
a Sony Watchman with no sound").
211. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's claim that it was
not expressing any opinion as to the validity of the new value exception); supra notes 146-
58 and accompanying text (reviewing the concurrence of Justices Thomas and the dissent
of Justice Stevens, each stating a definitive resolution to this question); supra notes 200-04
and accompanying text (explaining the Court's views in Ahlers).
212. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1422 ("[The Debtor's plan] is doomed ... by its
provision for vesting equity in the reorganized business in the Debtor's partners without








The first hurdle should be the easier of the two to overcome.
Bank of America demonstrates that exclusivity may no longer remain
a part of a new value proposal.211 For a plan that is part of an
attempted cramdown to survive the Court's scrutiny, the plan must be
proposed outside the 120-day exclusivity period provided by
§ 1121(b).21 Consequently, others would have an opportunity to
submit competing plans, and any new value plan that is approved
should be approved based on its superiority to the other proposals
and not "on account of" a prior interest. The only way that a
nonconsensual new value plan proposed during the period of
exclusivity would have any chance of being confirmed is if the plan
provided some degree of market testing that would demonstrate the
validity of the price.219 This requirement poses more difficulty for
those attempting to craft a potentially successful new value plan.20
Because the Court's ruling appears to impose a market measure
requirement on new value cramdowns, scholars have been discussing
many approaches for satisfying this prerequisite. 2 '1 Of these
suggestions, three seem to make the most sense. One of the most
popular proposals is to hold an auction or engage in some sort of
bidding process for the equity in the reorganized debtor.'m This idea
was mentioned by the Court in Bank of America, but only in
declaring that the Court was not passing judgment on that type of
plan.2 The theory behind the auction proposal is that it effectively
deals with the valuation problem inherent to exclusive new value
217. See id at 1422-24.
21& See Salerno et al., supra note 31, at 1 ("[A]ny debtor that wishes to avail itself of a
'new value' cramdown plan must kiss exclusivity good-bye."); supra note 64 and
accompanying text (discussing the Code's exclusivity period in which the debtor alone may
propose a plan of reorganization).
219. See Salerno et al., supra note 31, at 1 (describing as "facially unconfirmable" any
new plan filed during the exclusivity window "unless it provides for a mechanism to have
'competing bids' for the equity in the reorganized debtor, or otherwise allow the 'market'
to test whether the debtor/plan proponent is paying the highest value for the equity");
Singer, supra note 18, at 33, 47 (arguing that any new value plan filed during the
exclusivity period would be "patently unconfirmable ... unless a mechanism is in place
that allows for competing bids for the equity in the reorganized venture or otherwise
provides a valuation of the interest retained or acquired through a 'market test' ").
220. See McDermott, supra note 3, at 26 (lamenting the Court's refusal to offer any
insight as to how market valuation should be undertaken).
221. See infra notes 222-53 and accompanying text (describing several proposals to
satisfy the Court's market measure requirement).
222. See Epling, supra note 27, at 337; Trost et al., supra note 26, at 480-82.
223. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1424 ("Whether a market test would require an
opportunity to offer competing plans or would be satisfied by a right to bid for the same
interest sought by old equity, is a question we do not decide here.").
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proposals.2 4
Presumably, an auction could work in one of two ways. The
debtor could instigate a true auction process through which it would
announce and conduct a bidding process over a stated period of time,
likely under the watch of a bankruptcy judge. Alternatively, it may
be sufficient for the debtor merely to state that its plan is open to
competing bidders. By waiving exclusivity, each option would appear
to appeal to the Court's concerns. In any given case, an auction
process would make the validity of the new value exception
immaterial. If the auction process was staged, then the winner
would receive the interest in the reorganized debtor not "on account
of" any prior interest, but rather "on account of" its superior bid. 2
6
An auction process could resolve the problem without having to await
a definitive resolution on the new value exception, which the
Supreme Court appears reluctant to provide.
While the auction process may be the obvious choice to
determine market value, it is also the most uncertain. Many
attributes of the bidding process would be left for a court to
determine, making an auction a potentially costly experiment. For
example, an issue remains as to whether there must be an actual
auction or merely a proposal to accept competing bids? 7 In addition,
it is unclear whether the bidding process would be limited to creditors
or would be open to third parties as well.m
These issues have been confronted in recent years by lower
224. Richard Epling effectively summarized the valuation issue that concerns the
Court:
[An auction process] attempts to deal with the problem that habitually occurs if
the court is required to place a value on the new equity-such a valuation is a
guess compounded by an estimate at best. The value of most equity positions on
the date of confirmation usually is zero, and anyone willing to pay one dollar in
cash for the new stock arguably has extended "new value." However, the fallacy
in this line of reasoning lies in misunderstanding what is being purchased. The
object of the bidder is not the value of the stock today, but the upside potential of
the stock as the reorganized debtor's business prospects improve over time.
Thus, any value which may be assigned by a court is speculative, just as any bid
for the stock is speculative. The way to avoid this trap is to let the interested
parties assign the market value by allowing them to bid against each other for the
new equity.
Epling, supra note 27, at 337.
225. See Trost et al., supra note 26, at 481.
226. See id.
227. See Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Conducting Equity Auctions Under




courts. In In re Bjolmes Realty Trust,' a Massachusetts bankruptcy
court held that an auction must be staged if a creditor who is a likely
purchaser of the equity interests objects to a reorganization plan.23
In Bjolmes, the auction involved a two-phased offer, first to creditors
and then to third parties? 31 By contrast, In re Ropt Limited
Partnership2 held that debtors must give notice of their intentions to
file a new value plan, and an auction is required only if the creditors
object to this planY 3 Thus, prior case law does not provide a solution
to these remaining issues. Other practical concerns of the auction
process involve how to ensure that all parties have equal
information, F whether the process can be kept fair to all parties, 25
and whether an auction would conflict with other non-bankruptcy
laws, such as securities regulationsI36  Thus, the auction process
carries with it many uncertainties and risks.
One alternative to the initiation of a bidding process would be
the termination of the exclusivity period, 7 which could be done
either at the time a new value plan is filed or following the failure of
229. 134 B.R. 1000 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
230. See id. at 1010. This Bjolmes-type auction concept was advocated in In re
Homestead Partners, Ltd., 197 B.R. 706,719 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996).
231. See Bjolmes, 134 B.R. at 1010.
232. 152 B.R. 406 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993).
233. See id at 412.
234. See Carla E. Craig, Court's Ruling on 'New Value' Exception Leaves Questions for
Continued Debate, N.Y. LJ., May 12,1999, at 1.
235. One commentator proposes a system whereby the parties involved in the auction
retain equal subscription rights to use at their discretion. See Epling, supra note 27, at
341-46. Shares of the debtor would be offered to creditors at a price established by the
old shareholders. See id at 343. All creditors would be allowed to subscribe to this offer
along with the old shareholders. See id at 345. The shares would be limited to the
amount of insolvency, but no higher. See id. at 343. If the offer is fully subscribed, the
creditors' claims will be paid off at 100%. See id This system is designed to ensure that a
fair price is paid for the interest in the reorganized debtor. See id at 341-42.
236. Because an auction would involve a sale of equity interests, the sale could collide
with the Securities Act of 1933. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1994); White & Medford, supra
note 227, at 31. The securities regulations could impose extraordinarily costly registration
requirements, and failure to comply with the rules could lead to severe civil and criminal
liability. See id. The private placement exception exempts certain equity sale transactions
from these requirements if they do not involve a public offering. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(2);
White & Medford, supra note 227, at 31. Transactions that involve substantial disclosure
are often exempt from the registration requirements, as the requirements are designed to
ensure significant disclosure. See United States v. Lindo, 18 F.3d 353, 358 (6th Cir. 1994);
Ackerberg v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 1328, 1336-37 (8th Cir. 1989); White & Medford, supra
note 227, at 31. Thus, with the extensive disclosure requirements inherent in Chapter 11,
it appears that this sort of equity sale may not be subject to the extra securities regulation
requirements. See In re Homestead Partners, Ltd., 197 B.R. at 718.
237. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (describing the 120-day exclusivity
period found in 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1994)).
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an attempted consensual confirmation of a new value plan.?8s The
termination of exclusivity should also yield a market-protected
price? 9  While the old equity holders are free to value the
reorganized debtor as they choose, the possibility of competing plans
should encourage a proper valuation from the debtor.240 This
proposal was adopted by the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission in a 1997 recommendation to Congress.241
Like an auction, this proposal has its flaws. Factors such as the
high cost of preparing and confirming a plan,24 2 as well as the
potential for competitors to employ facially neutral plans with built-in
business advantages,243 could chill the bidding process. If these
disincentives prove strong enough, they could decrease the
effectiveness of the market test to the point where it is no longer a
beneficial alternative.244 Another problem with termination is a
practical one that occurs once exclusivity is terminated and the
debtors and creditors have been given the opportunity to propose
competing plans. The available plans are usually incredibly diverse,
making it extremely difficult to compare the merits of each plan and
select which one is most beneficial for all involved.24 5 The uniqueness
of the proposals would make it harder for courts to evaluate and
choose among the plans.
24 6
The third and final proposal for easing the Court's concerns over
market valuation is likely the most practical of the three. Instead of
organizing an auction process or revising the Bankruptcy Code to
provide for a termination of exclusivity, it may be possible for the
debtor wishing to propose a new value plan to waive the period of
exclusivity, thereby immediately opening bidding for competing
plans.247 A debtor simply could make a motion to the court that the
238. See Trost et al., supra note 26, at 482. A consensual confirmation occurs when
each class of creditors accepts the reorganization plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a)(8) (1994).
239. See Trost et al., supra note 26, at 482-82.
240. See Epling, supra note 27, at 338.
241. See NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT
TWENTY YEARS, § 2.4.15, at 545-67 (1997). The NBRC's proposal would have codified
the new value exception, but would have automatically terminated exclusivity if the debtor
sought to confirm a nonconsensual new value plan. See id. Congress has not shown any
willingness to adopt this proposal, however. See Singer, supra note 18, at 32.
242. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 26, 1129.04[4][c], at 1129-122.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See Epling, supra note 27, at 347-48 (describing the difficulty in choosing between
competing plans at this stage).
246. See id.
247. See Salerno et al., supra note 31, at 1; Singer, supra note 18, at 47.
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debtor plans to waive the statutory period of exclusivity?8 This
waiver could be done in conjunction with an auction process249 or
possibly as part of a standard confirmation z0  Of course, waiving
exclusivity is not without its pitfalls. As with early termination of the
exclusivity period, waiving exclusivity could also produce an
abundance of disparate plans, a result that could further cloud the
reorganization process."' Nevertheless, because the waiver would
end the period of exclusivity and open the process for competing bids,
such a proposal would appear to have the Court's blessing.252
These proposals, while not without their faults, seem to provide
what the Court in Bank of America was looking for: some measure of
market protection to ensure that the price paid by old equity to retain
their interest in a new value plan is the best price possible. Numerous
other proposals are available to debtors, most of which would
accomplish the same objective 5 3 The key will be to find the method
that provides sufficient market protection for all phases of the
procedure and avoids any appearances of exclusivity.
The Court's discussion regarding the need for a market test left
the bankruptcy community with a feeling of uncertainty, especially
considering its lack of guidance as to how such a test should be
248. See Singer, supra note 18, at 47.
249. See iL
250. See id.
251. See supra note 245-46 and accompanying text (describing the problems that
diversity of plans could cause under a termination of exclusivity proposal).
252. Alternatively, the debtor may choose to allow the 120-day exclusivity period to
run its course and then file its plan on the next day. See Singer, supra note 18, at 46. This
alternative permits the debtor to not show its cards early in the process, while presumably
still allowing market forces to operate properly, because the plan will be proposed outside
the period of exclusivity. See id. Such a plan may draw suspicion from the courts, which
could view this as an attempt to evade the market requirements.
253. See Epling, supra note 27, at 340. Two proposals that Professor Epling mentions
as proposed efforts to implement a market test are revaluations and clawbacks. See id.
Revaluations re-examine the value of the business several years after the plan to see how
it turned out and what adjustments need to be made, if any; clawbacks permit junior
creditors to retain "clawback rights" so that they may return with their claim if the
company is performing well in the years following the reorganization. See id.; see also
McDermott, supra note 3, at 27-28 (suggesting that a lender request to have the court
terminate the automatic stay, which would allow the lender to test the debtor's proposed
plan against the market by advertising a foreclosure sale); id. at 28 (proposing that the
lender make a motion asking the bankruptcy judge to compel an auction of the debtor's
property under 11 U.S.C. § 363); Singer, supra note 18, at 46-47 (suggesting that the
debtor place unspecified provisions in its plan prior to confirmation, which would subject
future participation to a market test); Trost et al., supra note 26, at 486-87 (advocating a
"liberalization" of new value standards as applied to closely held corporations because the
new value exception was designed to apply to large publicly held companies and not to
their closely held counterparts).
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implemented. Nevertheless, more litigation likely will follow to
determine what will placate the Court's demand for a market test.25
4
In any event, Bank of America means that any new value plan
proposed within the exclusivity period that fails to include some
feature that promotes a market valuation has no chance of being
confirmedV55 Beyond these conclusions, little can be said with any
degree of certainty about the future of new value.
Despite efforts to formulate a plan that will satisfy the Court's
market test requirement, it must be remembered that even if a
completely market-friendly new value plan is filed, there are no
guarantees that the Supreme Court will uphold it. While the Court
stated that a new value plan that provided the equity holders with
exclusive opportunities could not be confirmed without some degree
of market protection,2s6 it never declared that a new value plan
without exclusivity and with market protection would be confirmed.
While one may assume that confirmation of a market-protected new
value plan is a mere formality, nothing with such a curious history as
the new value exception should be taken for granted.
ALEXANDER F. WATSON
254. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 26, 1129.04[4][c], at 1129-123;
PRACTISING LAW INST., UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS OF BANKRUPTCY AND
REORGANIZATION 1055 (1999); Miller & Murray, supra note 210, at 150.
255. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text (stating that any new value plan
proposed during the period of exclusivity that does not provide any market protection will
not be confirmed).
256. See Bank of America, 119 S. Ct. at 1424.
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